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xperience indicates we are overdue for
another influenza pandemic (1, 2).
Unless effective action is taken now,
we will be in dire straits. Immunization
remains the cornerstone of our strategy, with
antiviral agents as a backup (3, 4), but produc-
ing and distributing a vaccine will take at least
4 to 6 months currently (5). In the meantime,
our main defenses will be nonpharmacologi-
cal interventions, such as hand washing, “res-
piratory etiquette,” face masks, school clo-
sure, and social distancing or isolation (6, 7).
These are ironically similar to the measures
used in 1918 to combat the greatest of all
known influenza pandemics (8, 9). 
Recent attempts to identify the most effec-
tive nonpharmacological interventions have
revealed that these measures have a thin science
base (6, 7, 10–13). For example, it is uncertain
whether influenza transmission from person to
person is primarily by large droplets or by fine
particles. Although this may seem a specialist
issue, it has a direct bearing on how far apart
people should position themselves to prevent
infection and on whether relatively inexpensive
face masks might be useful. Recent results in
the guinea pig (14) indicated that transmission
of influenza could occur even when cages were
kept ~3 feet apart, which contradicts conven-
tional wisdom. The results should be con-
firmed in other models.
Another aspect of transmission that we
don’t understand is why, when the number
of secondary infections arising from each
infected individual (R
0
) is relatively low (15),
breaking the transmission chain by nonphar-
macological measures has proved so challeng-
ing. R
0
< 1 would imply that transmission is no
longer self-sustaining.
Many of our assumptions are based on
analogies with other respiratory infections, such
as rhinoviruses, which are generally more stable
than influenza viruses and differ in other physi-
cal properties. These analogies are useful, but
should be interpreted with caution. Many rhi-
novirus infections can be transmitted via con-
tamination on hands, but there is no evidence to
indicate that this transmission mechanism
is important for influenza. Although there are
excellent literature reviews (6, 7), there are no
readily accessible compendia of best practices
or even comprehensive databases of commu-
nity epidemiologic data, which might help to
design the most effective interventions.
Community studies and clinical trials in
humans are needed. Seasonal influenza pro-
vides regular real-world opportunities to fill
some of the enormous gaps in our knowledge.
Availability of attenuated live influenza vac-
cines (e.g., FluMist) may allow transmission
and intervention studies to be done safely
under more carefully controlled conditions
than have previously been possible. 
Also often neglected are protective meas-
ures that fall between individual protection
and the whole population—the “excluded
middle,” such as buildings, facilities, and
smaller areas, including work places and
homes. Examples might include improved air-
handling systems, room-size fans, portable
air-filtration units, or physical barriers such as
room dividers and doors. Industrial hygienists
and engineers have considerable accumulated
expertise that could be more regularly applied
to protecting the built environment from
pandemics. Lessons learned from protecting
buildings or large spaces from bioterror-
ist agents (17) are also relevant. Protection
should be included in new construction and
retrofitted in older spaces  (17), from work
spaces to buildings to indoor public areas.
Individuals must have good information
on which to base choices. Guidelines remain a
menu of general options with little specific
advice. Some modeling results (18) suggest
that simple measures could be quite effective.
Although many of these suggestions seem just
common sense (such as keeping a sick family
member in a separate room with a closed
door), there is no systematic evaluation of
best practices for “home infection control.” A
starting point might be modifying experience
from health-care settings for the home. 
On the positive side, there has been increas-
ing interest in nonpharmacological strategies
and in filling the data gaps in epidemiology and
transmission (6, 7, 10–13). The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) re-
cently awarded grants to study nonpharmaco-
logical interventions in community settings.
Although a commendable start, the CDC pro-
gram so far represents $5.2 million in a total
proposed pandemic influenza budget of $7.1
billion. The National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases (NIAID) may also include
related areas in their funding. We should sys-
tematically address knowledge gaps now dur-
ing upcoming flu seasons, rather than wait to
empirically test measures ad hoc when the next
pandemic is upon us.
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Most scientists consider another influenza
pandemic inevitable, but there is little
information on how best to protect the public
before a vaccine can be made available.
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